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TAKING AIM AT AN AMERICAN MYTH 
Paul Finkelman* 
ARMING AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL GUN CULTURE. By 
Michael A. Bellesiles. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2000. Pp. 16, 603. 
Cloth, $30; paper, $16. 
Every American had a musket hanging over his fireplace at night, 
and by his side during the day. Like Cincinnatus, time and again 
Americans dropped their plows to shoulder their arms, to fight the In­
dians, the French, the Indians, the British, the Indians, the Mexicans, 
the Indians yet again, and then, from 1861 to 1865, each other. Ameri­
can men were comfortable with guns; they needed them and wanted 
them. They felt at home in woods, in search of food, or in defense of 
their homesteads. 
It is a story as old as our first pulp novels and earliest movies. It is 
larger than John Wayne and as real to us as Ronald Reagan narrating 
Death Valley Days. And, as Michael Bellesiles1 persuasively demon­
strates, it is largely untrue. 
In Arming America, Michael Bellesiles challenges - indeed, de­
molishes - the pervasive notion that America was always a nation of 
gun owners, gun users, and most importantly, gun lovers. While vul­
nerable to some criticism,2 this is one of the most important books in 
American history of the last decade. It has gathered great praise and 
at least one major award, the Bancroft Prize for the best book in 
American history. Bellesiles offers a full scale, and for the most part 
successful, attack on one of the most persistent myths of American 
culture: that throughout our early history Americans were a gun­
toting people, skilled at shooting and hunting, often violent, using 
their guns to defend their honor or just to settle an argument, and 
* Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. B.A. 
1971, Syracuse University; M.A., 1972, University of Chicago; Ph.D. 1976, University of 
Chicago; Fellow in Law and Humanities, 1982-83, Harvard Law School. - Ed. 
1. Professor of History, Emory University; Director, Emory Center for the Study of 
Violence. 
2. Most importantly, Professor James Lindgren of Northwestern University has chal­
lenged Bellesiles's use and analysis of probate records. See James Lindgren & Justin Lee 
Heather, Counting Guns in Early America (2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author). It is also quite likely that some of Bellesiles's other counts may not hold up. For ex­
ample, he notes studies of newspapers for states or cities in which no gunsmiths advertised. 
Pp. 228-29. It is possible that a study of other papers from the same city or state will find a 
gunsmith here or there, but such minor details will not alter the general picture Bellesiles has 
painted. 
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ready at a moment's notice to grab musket and powder horn to defend 
their homes and homeland. 
The story Bellesiles tells is different, persuasive, and, most of all, 
logical. Bellesiles makes many contributions to our understanding of 
guns in early America, many of which run counter to our myths but 
logically dovetail with what else we know about society. For example, 
Bellesiles demonstrates that: 
1) Guns, at least until the mid-nineteenth century, were expensive, 
costing the equivalent of two months' wages (p. 106). Before the 
1750s, few outside of the upper class could afford them. From the first 
settlement until the eve of the Civil War, guns were scarce and largely 
unavailable. Indeed, there was a persistent shortage of guns, even for 
military purposes, from the earliest English settlements until the mid­
dle of the Civil War. 
2) Hunting was a time consuming, inefficient way of finding food 
or making a living. While some men on the frontier hunted for a living, 
they were rare and relatively unsuccessful. Most Americans on the 
frontier were farmers, raising corn, hogs, and cattle. As scholars of the 
European invasion of the Americas have long known, domesticated 
animals and the ability to grow crops, especially wheat, were keys to 
the success of Europeans on the frontier. 3 Thus, as Bellesiles notes: 
If a settler wanted meat, he did not pull his trusty and rusty musket, inac­
curate beyond twenty yards, off the hook above the door and spend the 
day cleaning and preparing it. . . .  To head off into the woods for two 
days in order to drag the carcass of a deer back to his family - assuming 
he was lucky enough to find one, not to mention to kill it - would have 
struck any American of the Colonial period as supreme lunacy. Far eas­
ier to sharpen the ax and chop off the head of a chicken or, as they all did 
in regular communal get-togethers, slaughter one of their enormous 
hogs, salting down the meat to last months. [p. 103] 
Even on the overland trail, hunting was time consuming and po­
tentially dangerous. People who spent time hunting might not make it 
across the great plains in time to miss winter (pp. 341-42). 
3) Americans had notoriously poor skills with weapons, and most 
did not know how to handle guns. Guns. were complicated and difficult 
to maintain. Many fell into disrepair, became rusty, and were mostly 
useless. Almost every account of military recruiting and militia mus­
ters - from the earliest colonial records through the beginning of the 
Civil War - describes vast numbers of American men who never held 
a gun, had no idea how to shoot one, and most importantly, had no in­
terest in learning. 
3. See, e.g., AL CROSBY, GERMS, SEEDS AND ANIMALS: STUDIES IN ECOLOGICAL 
HISTORY (1994); AL CROSBY, THE COLUMBIAN EXCHANGE: BIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF 1492 (1977). 
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4) The American militia was almost universally incompetent, and 
with a few notable exceptions, in all of America's wars the militia was 
rarely successful in battle. During the colonial wars, the Revolution, 
and the Civil War, Americans had to be trained not only to march and 
dig fortifications, but also to load and fire guns. Contrary to our 
popular myths, the American Revolution was not won by the militias, 
although clearly in a few important battles the militias were heroic, 
competent, and successful. Rather, the war was won by the national 
army, trained for the most part by professional soldiers from Europe, 
like Baron von Steuben, Tadeusz Koscuiszko, and the Marquis de 
Lafayette.4 
5) Before the Civil War, guns were extremely complicated tools, 
requiring practice and skill to load and fire. A small miscalculation in 
the amount of powder placed in a gun could tum it into a harmless 
noisemaker or, just as easily, into a dangerous exploding device more 
likely to injure the one holding the gun than anyone else. 
6) Bellesiles demonstrates that gun ownership did not become 
common until after the Civil War. The reason is largely economic and 
technological. During the war the United States rapidly and success­
fully expanded its production of weapons, developing new manufac­
turing technologies and new kinds of weapons. The end of the war left 
the nation with a surplus of guns and, just as significantly, a number of 
companies that faced bankruptcy if they did not find a new market for 
their product. Thus, advertising, entrepreneurship, and economies of 
scale led to the arming of America after the Civil War (p. 431) .  Tied to 
this development was the existence of millions of veterans now skilled 
in the use of guns, and thus able safely to handle them (pp. 428-29). 
These are just some of the basics Bellesiles teaches as he forces us 
to unlearn our myth and to relearn American history. 
For legal scholars, Bellesiles teaches a vital story that helps explain 
both our modern gun culture and the origin of the Second Amend­
ment. The story shows that the personal ownership of weapons was 
not a central aspect of early American society and that, for the most 
part, guns were regulated. In addition, Bellesiles shows that while the 
militias of early America were for the most part underarmed, under­
trained, and relatively ii:icompetent, the image of the militia was a cen­
tral myth in the development of the nation. At the end of the Revolu­
tion, Americans knew that "Republican ideology had not won the 
Revolution. The militia, Jefferson's repository of courage and virtue 
had not come through in times of ultimate crisis; the Continental 
army, the professional soldiers, had" (p. 207). But Americans desper-
4. Thus, at Valley Forge, Washington worked with von Steuben to train the American 
soldiers to be more like European professionals, and to drill them so they would look less 
and less like militiamen. JOHN SHY, A PEOPLE NUMEROUS AND ARMED: REFLECTIONS ON 
THE MILITARY STRUGGLE FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 155 (1976). 
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ately wanted to believe in the myth of the citizen-soldier. Thus, they 
enshrined the myth of the militia into their ideology. As historian 
Charles Royster notes, "Americans reclaimed the war from the army 
to whom they had tried to entrust it" and thus "[t]he future security of 
American independence would rest not on a military establishment 
but on public virtue. To believe that public virtue had the strength to 
sustain independence, Americans wanted to believe that public virtue 
had won it."5  
Thus, after the Revolution, America wanted to assign the national 
defense to the militia. This was necessary because Americans had in­
vested so much of their ideological energy in attacking the very idea of 
a standing army or a professional army that it was antithetical to the 
Revolution now to admit that Independence had been won by profes­
sional soldiers. But of course, many Americans who lived through the 
war, including such delegates to the Constitutional Convention as 
George Washington, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and 
General Charles Cotesworth, Pinckney knew better. They knew that a 
well-armed standing army, not an incompetent and underarmed mili­
tia, was necessary to the security of a free state. In framing the Consti­
tution they provided for the development of such an army. The mili­
tary provisions of Article I of the U.S. Constitution bear this out.6 To 
satisfy the mythmakers and the need for the myth, however, the First 
Congress agreed to enshrine the militia, promising not to disarm it, as 
long as it was "well regulated" and under the authority of national 
government, as set out in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. In 
fact, as Bellesiles shows, the Second Amendment's promise not to dis­
arm the well-regulated militias was meaningless, because for the most 
part the militias had no arms to begin with. As Bellesiles demon­
strates, the people, both collectively and as individuals, were basically 
unarmed at the time the Bill of Rights was written. 
I. How BELLESILES CLARIFIES WHAT WE ALREADY KNEW 
One of the central contributions of this book is that it helps make 
sense of American history and, by extension, American constitutional 
law. Since almost all scholars have labored under the myths about 
guns and the militia, there has always been. a disconnect between what 
we knew about history and what we "knew" about guns and the mili­
tia.7 A few examples of what almost all educated Americans "know" 
5. P. 207 (quoting CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR: THE 
CONTINENTAL ARMY AND AMERICAN CHARACTER, 1775-1783, at 351 (1979)). 
6. See generally Paul Finkelman, "A Well Regulated Militia": The Second Amendment in 
Historical Perspective, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 195 (2000). 
7. Pp. 10-12 (citing WESLEY FRANK CRAVEN, THE COLONIES IN TRANSITION, 1660-
1713, at 30-31 (1968); WILLIAM C. DAVIS, A WAY THROUGH THE WILDERNESS: THE 
NATCHEZ TRACE AND THE CIVILIZATION OF THE SOUTHERN FRONTIER (1995); JOHN M. 
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about our history underscore how Bellesiles's findings help us make 
sense of things. Essentially, by demythologizing our understanding of 
arms, gun ownership, and the militia, Bellesiles allows for a more co­
herent understanding of our past. 
A. Myth and Reality: Gun-Toting Americans and the Revolution 
We "know" that all Americans had guns at the beginning of the 
Revolution. They are over the fireplace in every colonial house that 
we have seen in the movies and on television.8 But we also know from 
historical research that at the beginning of the war Americans were 
desperate for guns. 
Consider one of the early victories of the war, which demonstrated 
both the scarcity of guns among the revolutionaries and the impor­
tance to the Continental Army commanders of obtaining guns. On 
May 10, 1775, less than a month after the war began, Ethan Allen and 
his Green Mountain Boys seized Fort Ticonderoga and its arsenal. 
This was a rare victory for civilians acting as soldiers during the 
Revolution. These were not even trained militia men, but rather, a 
collection of local frontiersmen who swarmed into the Fort. Signifi­
cantly, this victory was not won by guns, in part because only twenty of 
the eighty-five men with Allen even owned a musket. Allen and his 
men seized the fort by surprise, not firepower. His men rushed the 
fort, "seized the neatly stacked muskets of the [British] regulars, and 
demanded the surrender of the shocked and confused commander," 
who if fact did not even know that "there was a war on" (p. 184). The 
Green Mountain Boys were now armed. As Bellesiles notes, others in 
the colonies soon followed "Allen's example, seizing whatever British 
arms and ammunition they could" (p. 185). 
Similarly, when we think about Lexington and Concord, we imag­
ine the Massachusetts farmers (who were probably the best armed in 
America) (pp. 150, 181) rushing out of their homes with muskets in 
hand. But the very reason the British were marching to Concord in the 
first place was to seize the militia's guns, powder, and shot stored in 
the local armory. In other words, the main cache of weapons was not 
DEDERER, WAR IN AMERICA TO 1775: BEFORE YANKEE DOODLE 116, 251 (1990); LEE 
KENNETT & JAMES LA VERNE ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A 
NATIONAL DILEMMA 108 (1995); WARREN MOORE, WEAPONS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION, at vi (1967); JAMES B. WHISKER, THE AMERICAN COLONIAL MILITIA 87, 
171 (1997); JAMES B. WHISKER, THE GUNSMITH'S TRADE 71, 91 (1992); HAROLD F. 
WILLIAMSON, WINCHESTER, THE GUN THAT WON THE WEST 5 (1952); Jenkins, Old Reli­
able, AM. RIFLEMAN, Dec. 1931; Harold R. Peterson, The Military Equipment of the 
Plymouth and Bay Colonies, 1620-1697, NEW ENG. Q., 1947, at 197). 
8. It is hard to fathom why these guns are invariably over the fireplace, unless they were 
always unloaded and the powder horns hanging with them were empty. It certainly makes no 
sense to store a weapon or powder near a fire, which might heat the powder to the point of 
combustion, or send a spark that would cause the gun to fire or the powder horn to explode. 
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in the farmhouses, but in the central storage house of the local militia. 
Many of the farmers that day were armed with edged weapons, par­
ticularly axes and hatchets (p. 174). 
Similarly, throughout the Revolution the Americans faced con­
stant shortages of guns, powder, and bullets. Captured British weap­
ons kept the Revolution going until an infusion of French and Dutch 
weapons, first sold and then given to the Americans, armed the Conti-
nental line. · 
B. Myth and Reality: The Militia and the American Revolution 
The myth of the militia was that the armed citizens rushed to the 
defense of their lands and families to fight for the patriot cause in the 
Revolution. The hardy farmers and frontiersmen were crack shots, 
ready to shoot the eyes out of the British. We "know" this was true 
because we read it over and over again. Thus, as one historian writing 
about Lexington and Concord noted, "[e]very narrative of the fignting 
speaks of the superior shooting of the provincials, with the easy as­
sumption that as a body they were marksmen" (p. 174). Moreover, as 
Bellesiles shows, before the American Revolution many patriot lead­
ers bragged about the martial skills of Americans. Richard Henry Lee 
claimed that the farmers of western Virginia "could hit an orange at 
two hundred yards" and that "[ e ]very shot is Fatal" (p. 178). Even 
James Madison bought into this propaganda effort, asserting that 
"[t]he strength of this Colony" was "chiefly in the rifle-men of the 
Upland Counties" who could hit "a man's face at the distance of 1 00 
Yards" (p. 178). In fact, neither Madison nor Lee had spent much time 
with these western marksmen. Had either man visited the frontier he 
would have learned that such men did not exist, and that many of the 
western men were actually unarmed. A more accurate appraisal of the 
situation is made clear by the petition Madison and other members of 
Virginia's council received from westerners pleading for aid for their 
"raw Militia,'' which was "ill armed, half Clad, ignorant of Discipline, 
& of every thing requisite" to the military tasks assigned to them (pp. 
178-79). 
Bellesiles argues that before, during, and after the Revolution, 
Americans had a need to believe in the strength of the militia. It dove­
tailed with Republican ideology and with the common hostility to a 
standing army. Illustrative of this ideology was the argument of the 
anti-Federalist John DeWitt, that "a militia and a standing body of 
troops never yet flourished in the same soil,'' and that "Tyrants have 
uniformly depended upon the latter, at the expence of the former."9 
Similar statements can be found from most of the Founders, although 
9. John DeWitt, V: To the Free Citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1787), 
in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 37 (Herbert Storing ed., 1981). 
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significantly not from those, like Washington, who had actually seen 
the militia in action and realized how ineffective it was in either win­
ning independence or defending the nation. Americans wanted to be­
lieve that the militia had won the Revolution and could win other 
wars. The history we know, and the history Bellesiles now clarifies, 
shows how wrong this was. 
Consider what we know about the battle of Bunker Hill, which is 
usually remembered as an American victory (even though it was not). 
In that battle the British suffered about a thousand casualties10 before 
the Americans fled from the field because their ammunition ran out. 
We "know" that the Americans were so successful at Bunker Hill be­
cause they were such great shots. But we also remember the command 
of the day: "Don't shoot until you see the whites of their eyes." 
Why did they hold their fire until the British were about to overrun 
them? In part because they were lousy shots ! Americans could hit nei­
ther an orange at 200 yards nor the face of an enemy at 100 yards. In 
fact, they could only hit the enemy if he was so close they could see his 
"the whites of his eyes." Only at point-blank range could these mili­
tiamen hit a Redcoat, despite the brilliant target his uniform made. 
Even if they had been better shots, however, it would have mat­
tered little, because the Americans were so short of ammunition. This 
shortage of ammunition and guns helps explain why Americans were 
such terrible shots. Marksmanship requires practice and more prac­
tice. "In shooting, as in other sports and most other activities, practice 
wins out over an imagined innate genius every time. Contrary to one 
of the most cherished fictions of American culture, simply living on 
the frontier did not make one an excellent shot" (p. 260). Such prac" 
tice required an abundance of guns, powder, and shot, which Ameri­
cans did not have during the colonial period. Because the Americans 
had a shortage of shot and powder, they could not afford to fire volley 
after volley as the British charged up the hill (p. 180). 
The battle at Lexington and Concord also illustrates the deficien­
cies of American martial skill and the paucity of American gun owner­
ship. It is true that at the Lexington Green the militia turned out, and 
while chased from the field of battle, these farmers and tradesmen 
harassed the British from behind trees and stone walls, sending the 
Redcoats fleeing back to Boston. The myth tells us that these Ameri­
can marksmen, skilled at shooting deer, now did the same to the hated 
British lobsterbacks. 
If that was so, though, why were so few British troops actually 
killed or wounded at Lexington and Concord? At least 3,763 Ameri­
cans "are known to have participated in this long day of battle" (p. 
174). At most the British had about 900 men in the field. Hopelessly 
10. SHY, supra note 4, at 103. 
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outnumbered, the British ultimately ran back to Boston, suffering 
seventy-three dead, 174 wounded, and twenty-six missing.11 This 
means that the more than 3,700 American militiamen managed to hit 
their targets - British soldiers - no more than 273 times.12 But even 
this figure is too high, because we know that some of the British sol­
diers were killed or wounded by axes, hatchets, knives, and swords -
weapons that were more common than guns, and tools that Americans 
did know how to wield. 
So how could it be that so many Americans failed to do more 
damage to the fleeing British troops? How could these American 
marksmen, skilled at killing deer and Indians, at home in the woods, 
almost born with musket in their hands, miss so often? 
The answer, as Bellesiles demonstrates, is twofold. First, many of 
these militiamen showed up at Lexington with axes, knives, and 
swords because they did not own guns. And those who did own guns 
brought for the most part rusty muskets, not more accurate rifles. And 
even if they had access to state-of-the-art weapons, they had little skill 
in using them. They were not hunters, Indian fighters, or marksmen. 
They were farmers, tradesmen, blacksmiths, teachers, and ministers 
roused to action by a silversmith. As one of the first historians to chip 
away at the myth of the American militia noted: "Every narrative of 
the fighting . . .  speaks of the superior shooting of the provincials, with 
the easy assumption that as a body they were marksmen," but in real­
ity, "marksmen they were not."1 3 
Nor, as the war continued, was it clear that they were "superior" to 
the British as soldiers. In the second year of the war the great pam­
phleteer Tom Paine complained that these were "the times that try 
men's souls," because the "summer patriots" had all gone home.1 4 In­
deed, throughout the War, the militia had a terribly annoying habit of 
simply disappearing, often before a battle or in the middle of the bat­
tle. As John Shy, who is sympathetic to the militia, noted some years 
ago, "militiamen would not automatically spring to arms in time of 
danger. They were afraid. They lacked the confidence that comes with 
training and experience."15 Bellesiles now shows us that they also 
lacked arms and ammunition. Indeed, throughout the war, the militia 
was unreliable and often useless. More than a few patriot soldiers 
needlessly lost their lives because the militia abandoned the battlefield 
and left the Continental line unprotected and undermanned. General 
11.  ROBERT A. GROSS, THE MINUTEMEN AND THEIR WORLD 130 (1976). 
12. This assumes the "missing" were wounded or killed by gunfire. 
13. ALLEN FRENCH, THE DAY OF CONCORD AND LEXINGTON: THE NINETEENTH OF 
APRIL, 1775, at 27 (1925). 
14. TOM PAINE, THE AMERICAN CRISIS 1 (1776), reprinted in COMMON SENSE AND 
RELATED WRITINGS 126 (Thomas P. Slaughter ed., 2001). 
15. SHY, supra note 4, at 151. 
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Nathaniel Greene complained that the militia "have refused to turn 
out when there has been the greatest want of their Assistance" (p. 
195). At the battle of Camden the militia fled in terror, leading to the 
death of General DeKalb and a major American defeat.16 Thus, 
Richard Henry Lee's assurances to his brother that western Virginia 
would send 6000 "Rifle Men that for their number make [the) most 
formidable light Infantry in the World" were unfounded (p. 178). As 
Bellesiles wryly notes, "[f)or some reason these six thousand marks­
men did not materialize during the war" (p. 178). 
Propaganda is always important in war, and at times both the 
Americans and British believed the patriot bravado. For most of the 
war, however, the cognoscente knew perfectly well that the militia was 
often useless. Washington's disdain for the militia is notorious. As 
early as 1757 he complained that in the Virginia militia, "[m]any of 
them [were] unarmed, and all [were] without ammunition or provi­
sion."17 He considered the militia "incapacitated to defend themselves, 
must less to annoy the enemy."18 In 1776 he "damned the militia and 
called on Congress for a professional army of long-service volun­
teers."19 In that year he privately complained "that no Dependence 
can be put on the Militia for a continuance in Camp, or Regularity and 
Discipline during the short time they may stay."20 By 1780 he had 
abandoned all hope of "carrying on a War with Militia."21 He con­
demned those who "extolled" the militia as "visionary Men whose 
credulity easily swallowed every vague story in support of a favorite 
Hypothesis," and declared he had never seen an example of the Mili­
tia "being fit for the real business of fighting" (p. 194). In one 
Maryland brigade, twenty-six percent of the men lacked weapons, 
while in a New York unit sixty-three percent were unarmed (p. 200). 
As a general and as President, he wanted a standing Army to defend 
the young nation (p. 218). 
Much of this history is well known to military historians. But, with 
the addition of Bellesiles's work, we can now better understand why 
the received story of an armed people has never fit well with the real-
16. P. 196. ROBERT MIDDLEKAUFF, THE GLORIOUS CAUSE: THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION, 1763-1789, at 456-57 (1982). 
17. P. 159 (quoting Letter from George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie (June 27, 
1757), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 77, 78-79 (C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931)). 
18. P. 159 (quoting Letter from George Washington to Robert Dinwiddie (June 27, 
1757), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 77, 79 (C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931)). 
19. SHY, supra note 4, at 151. 
20. P. 194 (quoting Letter from George Washington to John Hancock (July 10, 1775), in 
2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 327 (W.W. Abbot ed., 1983)). 
21. Id.; p. 194 (quoting George Washington, Circular to the States (October 18, 1780), 
reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 77, 78-79 (C. Fitzpatrick ed., 
1931)). 
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ity of an incompetent and unarmed militia. The people simply were 
never armed or skilled with firearms. 
C. Myth and Reality: Guns in the Early Republic 
After the Revolution, Americans were no more skilled with fire­
arms than before, and they were just as unlikely to own any. Gunmak­
ers were rarer than gunsmiths. Bellesiles' studies of newspapers show 
no gunmakers or gunsmiths advertising in the newspapers in 
Maryland, South Carolina, or Philadelphia between 1786 and 1800 (p. 
229). Between 1777 and 1799 only nine gunsmiths advertised in New 
York City's newspapers (p. 228). It may be that the studies on which 
Bellesiles relies are off by a gunsmith here and there. But the conclu­
sion seems overwhelming: guns were simply not very important to 
most Americans. Expensive, complicated, and difficult to maintain, 
they were the playthings of the rich and well born, just as hunting was 
usually the sport of the elite, who had the time to waste tramping 
through the forest looking for game. 
A quick look at the various early federal statutes on militias, most 
of which Bellesiles discusses, reveals again how his insights are con­
firmed by other forms of evidence. What we "know" about the federal 
militia acts now makes sense, because Bellesiles has filled in the in­
formation on the shortage of guns in America. 
Under the Militia Act of 179222 the federal government expected 
militia men to arm themselves. As Bellesiles notes, however, "nothing 
of this sort happened" (p. 262). Thus, a few years later, Congress re­
sponded with the Militia Acts of 179423 and 1797,24 which required the 
state governors to "arm and equip according to law" the state militias. 
It is not clear if the "according to law" referred back to the 1792 stat­
ute, or if this now meant that the states were to arm the militias. Any 
confusion was cleared in 1798, when Congress passed "An Act pro­
viding Arms for the Militia throughout the United States."25 As the ti­
tle suggests, Congress had given up on the people providing their own 
arms. Thus, Congress declared that the United States would provide 
"thirty thousand stand of arms" to "be sold to the governments of the 
respective States, or the militia thereof."26 
With a possible war against France looming on the horizon, the 
United States could no longer live with the mythology of an armed 
22. "An Act more effectually to provide for the National Defence . . . .  " Act of May 8, 
1792, 1 Stat. 271. 
23. Act of May 9, 1794, 1 Stat. 367. 
24. Act of June 24, 1797, 1 Stat. 522. 
25. Act of July 6, 1798, 1 Stat. 576. 
26. Id. 
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populace. The reality was that the people owned few guns, and many 
of them were old, rusted, and in disrepair. No war with France took 
place, but when the Jeffersonians came to power they discovered the 
nation's defenses were weak. In 1803, Secretary of War Henry 
Dearborn authorized a national census of arms and weapons. 
"Dearborn discovered that [only] 45 percent of the militia bore arms,'' 
and that less than a quarter of the nation's white male population (less 
than five percent of the total population) owned a gun (pp. 262-63). 
Such figures illustrated the need for the Militia Act of 1803, which de­
clared that "every citizen duly enrolled in the militia shall be con­
stantly provided with arms, accoutrements, and ammunition."27 
This Act, as well as the earlier Act of 1798, was consistent with the 
obligations of Congress to "provide for organizing, arming, and disci­
plining the Militia."28 But, until this time Congress had failed to fulfill 
the Constitution's command. There seem to be three complementary 
explanations for the failure of Congress to act up until this time. First, 
there may have been an economic concern - lack of funds to supply 
the militias. This was tied to the second reason - lack of guns in the 
country. Guns were scarce, and therefore expensive. Congress could 
not supply the militia, because there were few guns to distribute. In­
deed, during this period Congress was buying guns, as well as gun 
locks and steel for the domestic production of weapons, from England 
(p. 232). Finally, in 1792, the leaders of Congress may have been suf­
fering from the effects of the revolutionary-era propaganda that the 
American people were well armed. In any event, by 1798 Congress re­
alized that if the militia was to be armed, the national government 
would have to supply the arms. 
The question, of course, was where the government would find 
these arms. Imports supplied some of the requirements, but a domes­
tic arms industry was the real answer. In his famous Report on the 
27. "An Act in addition to an act entitled, 'An act more effectually to provide for the 
National defence . . .  .' " Act of Mar. 2, 1803, 2 Stat. 207. At page 230 Bellesiles mistakenly 
asserts that this provision of the 1803 act was part of the 1792 act. My guess is that his confu­
sion resulted from either looking at a compilation of statutes which combined the two, or by 
looking at various reenactments of the militia law in 1813 and 1814, see p. 521 n.85. He may 
have also carelessly used an early compilation, THE MILITIA LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 
AND MASSACHUSETTS (1836), which was anonymously published in Boston, rather than 
looking at the United States Statutes at Large. This suggests the complexity of doing legal re­
search from this period - or simply some sloppy note-taking - but does not indicate any 
attempt by Bellesiles to misrepresent the facts to support his thesis. In fact, as I argue in this 
section of the Review, the correct story provides even greater support for Bellesiles's overall 
argument: that the Congress bought the myth of an armed populace in 1792, and starting in 
1798 began to abandon that idea. By 1803, only eleven years after the first Militia Act, 
Congress had completely rejected the foolish notion of relying on the members of the militia 
to bring their own arms with them. They had no arms to bring, and Congress finally admitted 
this. 
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
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Subject of Manufactures29 Alexander Hamilton had urged support for 
gun manufacturing and gunpowder as a national necessity. 30 Despite 
his support for private enterprise, Hamilton suggested that "necessary 
weapons of war" might be manufactured by the government itself. 31 
He similarly urged the stimulation of lead manufacturing, 32 and he was 
ready to exempt both saltpeter and sulfur from import duties because 
they were necessary for the creation of a domestic gunpowder indus­
try, and the United States had no domestic supply. 3 3  
Beginning in 1795, the national government followed Hamilton's 
advice and tried to stimulate gun production in America. But this at­
tempted stimulation failed. For instance, after the Revolution, 
Congress armed soldiers by purchasing seven thousand muskets from 
England (p. 232). This practice of buying guns and, more importantly, 
gunlocks from Great Britain continued until the War of 1812 inter­
rupted the flow. Attempts by American entrepreneurs did nothing to 
stimulate a domestic supply of weapons. In 1795, Eli Whitney won a 
contract to produce weapons for the country. Despite the myth of 
Whitney inventing interchangeable parts, Bellesiles demonstrates that 
the inventor of the cotton gin produced almost no usable weapons for 
his country (pp. 233-35). The United States government did manage to 
develop a few factories of its own that produced weapons at national 
armories in Springfield, Massachusetts, and Harpers Ferry, Virginia 
(now West Virginia), but the numbers were small. Between 1795 and 
1799, Springfield produced only 7,750 muskets - about a third of 
what was needed (p. 238). In the Civil War this armory would be es­
sential to the national defense, but in the War of 1812 it was only mar­
ginally valuable. 
The conclusion from statutes, production records, various gun cen­
suses, government reports, and newspaper records is overwhelming: 
After the Revolution, Americans had few guns and could produce few 
guns. The people, with some exceptions, were relatively unarmed. 
D. Myth and Reality: The Militia and the War of 1812, or Who Really 
Saved New Orleans? 
During the War of 1812, the militias were for the most part useless, 
and often unarmed. Fewer than 4,500 British soldiers captured and 
burned Washington, D.C., despite the presence of "some fifty thou-
29. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Report on the Subject of Manufactures (Dec. 5, 1791), in 
10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230 (Harold c. Syrett et al. eds., 1966). 
30. Id. at 317, 334. 
31. Id. at 317. 
32. Id. at 319. 
33. Id. at 334. 
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sand militia within a day's march of the capital" (p. 254). Those few 
that did show up to defend the nation's capital lacked guns, flints, and 
leadership. One militia regiment came to Washington "wholly un­
armed," and thus was of little use in defending the city (p. 255). This 
shortage was not unique to the region around the national capital. 
Counting all guns in private hands and in public armories, regardless 
of their age or condition, New York had only enough weapons for half 
of its militiamen, and Virginia could only arm twenty-three percent of 
its militia (p. 255). The same situation arose in the West. Over 2,300 
Kentucky militiamen showed up at New Orleans to serve under 
Andrew Jackson, but only 700 of them had guns, and Jackson com­
plained that "the arms they have are not fit for use" (p. 259). 
After the Battle of New Orleans, Americans created myths and 
songs about the "Hunters of Kentucky" who won the battle with their 
marksmanship. In reality, however, these mostly unarmed frontiers­
men were farmers who had few skills with a musket. Cannon "manned 
by members of the U.S. Navy and Army," as well as by Jean Lafite's 
pirates, won the battle, along with some regular soldiers armed by the 
national government (p. 259). But as Bellesiles notes, "the myth of the 
Kentucky riflemen picking which eye of British officers to shoot out 
fulfilled some deep national yearning. An imagined American equality 
seemed to demand that every man could be the equal of the best 
trained troops in the world - at least in popular songs and tall tales" 
(p. 259). 
E. Myth and Reality: Bleeding Kansas and Guns in Antebellum 
America 
Bellesiles argues, correctly I believe, that the "arming of America" 
began to take shape after the Mexican-American War (1846-47) and 
that it continued to accelerate until the Civil War. This appears to be 
true, but the evidence from Kansas shows that this process of arming 
America was incomplete, and rather slow, as late as the 1850s. 
Bellesiles only briefly mentions the events in Kansas - the scene of 
America's warm up for the Civil War - in the mid-1850s. He notes, 
for example, that members of the Connecticut Kansas Colony, setting 
out for what was already "Bleeding Kansas" in 1856, were given fifty 
rifles by their supporters and friends in state (p. 370). Bellesiles uses 
this information to illustrate the acceleration of the arming of America 
immediately before the Civil War. The fact that these settlers had to 
be given weapons en route to a hostile environment, however, sug­
gests that many people in America as late as the 1850s did not own 
guns. Moreover, Kansas was not as well armed as even Bellesiles as­
sumes. Furthermore, if the settlers did have any guns, few in Kansas 
actually knew how to use them. Bellesiles notes that two free-state 
men were captured by proslavery forces because, while they had four 
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guns with them, they had no firing caps, and thus the guns were useless 
(p. 370). The free-state military leader James Montgomery urged that 
volunteers be trained in the use and care of weapons before they ar­
rived in the territory (p. 370). 
What little Bellesiles says about Kansas dovetails with the larger 
story in the territory. Moreover, Bellesiles's overall thesis helps ex­
plain the nature of the early struggle in Kansas. 
After the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, free-state 
settlers swarmed into the territory and quickly became involved in a 
mini-Civil War, fighting settlers from the slave states. Many - per­
haps most - of the settlers came not for politics, but for fresh, inex­
pensive land. Even the most famous family to move to Kansas, the 
Browns of Ohio, came for land and a fresh start in life. Like so many 
other Northerners, the Browns thought keeping Kansas a free state 
could be done with the ballot box, or with moral suasion. They did not 
come to fight. But, very quickly, they found themselves in an armed 
conflict. 3 4  
The patriarch of the family, John Brown, remained in Ohio while 
his sons went to the new territory. In May 1855, a fearful Salmon 
Brown wrote his father: "There is a great lack of arms here . . . .  " 3 5  
Similarly, John Brown, Jr., wrote his father that the antislavery men 
were "desperately short of guns." 3 6  John Jr. begged his father to find 
some wealthy supporters of the cause to buy guns. "Give us the arms, 
and we are ready for the contest."37 At the moment they had only a 
few Sharps rifles sent by some eastern abolitionists. Thus it was that in 
the summer of 1855 John Brown toured the East and Midwest, raising 
money to buy Colt revolvers, Sharps rifles, powder, caps, and swords. 38 
In October 1855, John Brown arrived in Kansas with "revolvers, rifles, 
dirk knives, and those menacing broadswords." 39 Meanwhile other 
boxes of rifles, sometimes known as a "Beecher's Bibles,"40 arrived in 
the free-state settlements of Kansas. The industrialist Amos Lawrence 
helped pay for about 325 Sharps rifles that were sent to free-state set­
tlers in Kansas.4 1  
34. STEPHEN B .  OATES, TO PURGE THIS LAND WITH BLOOD: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN 
BROWN 90-93 (2d ed. 1984). 
35. Id. at 88. 
36. Id. at 90. 
37. Id. at 92. 
38. Id. at 92-93. 
39. Id. at 98. 
40. Named after the fervent abolitionist the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher. 
41. DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861, at 206-07 (Don E. 
Fehnrenbacher ed., 1976). 
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Why did John Brown have to bring guns to his sons in Kansas? 
Why didn't they bring their own? Why were the Connecticut Kansas 
settlers Bellesiles writes about have to be given guns when they left 
(pp. 370-71)? Although I have long taught and even written about 
Brown, 42 only after reading Bellesiles do I understand the answers to 
these questions. As Bellesiles repeatedly demonstrates, most Ameri­
can men in the mid-nineteenth century did not own a gun and could 
not afford the luxury of buying one. Thus, the settlers who went to 
Kansas to make it a free state did so without guns, or, if they took 
guns, like the Connecticut Kansas Colony settlers, they took them be­
cause "without any agency of our own, we were presented with fifty 
Rifles, which we gladly accepted" (p. 370). 
F. Myth and Reality: Where Were All Those Guns When the Civil 
War Began? 
A final example of how Bellesiles's book helps explain American 
history concerns the American Civil War. The myth of America is that 
all white men, especially in the South, were heavily armed. We all 
"know" this. But we also well know that, with just under 160,000 guns, 
the Confederacy was desperately short of arms when the war began. 
The Confederacy did everything it could to import them from Europe, 
but Lincoln's blockade effectually stopped these imports by 1863. The 
would-be nation failed to produce many guns of its own, and through­
out the war the Confederacy survived with weapons captured from the 
enemy, taken from dead United States soldiers, or sneaked past the 
blockade (p. 419). A few European guns made it to the Confederacy 
through Mexico. 
If the myth of a gun-owning America had been true, these short­
ages would not have been so great. Moreover, with over four million 
slaves in 1860, the region was a tinderbox waiting to explode, and only 
the vigilance of the master class prevented this. The South should have 
been well armed because of the apparent need of the master class for 
arms, the presumption that rural men were all gun owners, and the 
cultural presupposition that the South was more gun happy than the 
North. But the South was not well armed because, as Bellesiles 
teaches us, guns were expensive, complicated, and, until the Civil War, 
manufactured in small numbers in the nation. 
42. HIS SOUL GOES MARCHING ON: RESPONSES TO JOHN BROWN AND THE HARPERS 
FERRY RAID (Paul Finkelman ed., 1976). 
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II. THE MILITIA, THE MYTH OF AN ARMED POPULACE, AND THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT 
Throughout much of our history, the militia has been held in con­
tempt, despite the fact that we have simultaneously created a myth 
about the success of the militia in battle and its role in both creating 
the nation in 1776-83 and defending it afterwards. The contradiction 
was of course a function of the ideology of the Revolution which con­
demned the professional, or "standing" Army, which became a proxy 
for everything that was wrong with the British Empire, and thus 
forced the revolutionaries to praise the militia. Thus, on the eve of the 
Revolution John Hancock noted that "[f]rom a well regulated militia 
we have nothing to fear," but he asked rhetorically, from a standing 
army "what has not a state to fear?"4 3 Of course, during the Revolu­
tion Americans learned just how ineffective the militia was, but the 
ideological commitment against a standing army forced Americans to 
enshrine the militia in popular myth. 
This cultural admiration for the militia also led to the adoption of 
what became the Second Amendment. Anti-Federalists, fearful of a 
strong national government, were particularly concerned about the re­
ality of a professional army, which Congress was clearly empowered to 
create under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. In writing the Bill 
of Rights, Madison did nothing to undermine national power, 4 4  but he 
was willing to offer up a promise that each state would be able to 
maintain a "well regulated militia," subject, of course to federal call 
up, as set out in Article I, Section 8. 
While the myth of the militia seemed important to Americans after 
the Revolution, the reality of the militia, both during and after the 
Revolution was another matter. And so, from the end of the Revolu­
tion to the Civil War the militia was generally held in contempt. We 
know (or at least we have long thought we knew)45 that the militia 
would parade annually or even twice a year, have its musters, and that 
usually the most important aspect of the muster was the keg of hard 
cider, or some other strong beverage. The militia was something of a 
joke from the colonial period to the Revolution to the Civil War. In 
43. JOHN PHILLIP REID, IN DEFIANCE OF LAW: THE STANDING-ARMY CONTROVERSY, 
THE Two CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COMING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 104 (1981). 
44. Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Adoption of the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant 
Paternity, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 301-47 (1991). 
45. One of the many things this book teaches us is that some states actually abolished 
their militias in the early and mid-nineteenth centuries, and that no states actually required 
people to serve. In 1811, for example, Delaware "essentially eliminated its militia." P. 387. 
When Lincoln asked the loyal state governors to call out their militias, "Governor William 
Burton of Delaware, informed Lincoln that their militia did not actually exist." P. 410. Simi­
larly, in Lincoln's home county of Sangamon, Illinois, people "were rudely reminded that 
they did not have a militia, and had not for the previous fifteen years." Pp. 409-10. 
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the eighteenth century, most militias "bee[ a ]me more social than mili­
tary organizations. " 46 The growth of private militias in the nineteenth 
century continued this process. The more social they became, the less 
likely the militias were to be serious military organizations. In the 
nineteenth century, the private militias were better dressed, often in 
snappy, brightly colored uniforms. They were social clubs, often, but 
not always, for the elite. When the Civil War began, the militias on 
both sides were barely competent and not much good in battle. Slowly, 
painfully, and at great expense of hunian life, American boys on both 
sides of the Mason-Dixon line learned to be soldiers. 
Indeed, the whole notion of the citizen-soldier from the colonial 
period to the Revolution appears largely to have been a myth. In co­
lonial New York, commercial connections, not the militia, kept the 
peace with the Iroquois. And as the University of Michigan's great 
military historian John Shy noted, "in time of trouble," New York 
"had to call for help." 47 In Virginia, the militia "virtually ceased to ex­
ist" in the half century after Bacon's Rebellion of 1676, 48 and the col­
ony relied for defense on Rangers - "a few dozen paid, mounted sol­
diers who 'ranged' " along the frontier from fort to fort. 49 In 1713, 
"[w]hen the Tuscarora momentarily menaced Virginia,"50 the gover­
nor tried to call out the militia, but no one turned out. Thus, the gov­
ernor, "convinced that he could not make war, made peace." 5 1  The 
same story could be told, as Bellesiles does, for most of the colonial 
militias. As we have seen, during the Revolution General Washington 
and others had nothing but contempt for the militia. Washington felt 
the same way when he was a colonel during the Seven Years War. In 
the War of 1812, the militias were almost nowhere to be seen and not 
terribly useful when they were around.52 
As Bellesiles notes, the militia was critical to the nation's psyche as 
a symbol of republican virtue. Americans at the time of the Revolu­
tion believed a standing army was dangerous, even though it was the 
professional army that, battling for eight years, fought the British to a 
standstill and forced the strongest nation in the world to the peace ta­
ble. 
The Constitution of 1787 reflected the reality of the recent past. 
Article I provided for the establishment of a military by the national 
government. The militia would exist but would be always subject to 
46. SHY, supra note 4, at 29. 
47. Id. at 27. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 25. 
50. Id. 
51. /d. at 27. 
52. Pp. 159-60, 254-55; supra text accompanying note 5.  
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federal regulation and control. This frightened some Americans, who 
feared a professional standing army and believed that the strength of 
the nation was in the militia.5 3  · 
Men like Washington, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Henry Knox, 
and even James Madison understood how absurd this was. They knew 
that the professional army, trained by Washington and a host of Euro­
pean officers, had won the war. Furthermore, former generals like 
Washington, Pinckney, and Knox also understood that the nation had 
nothing to fear from the military. Good republicans all, they trusted 
the officers and men under their command to support the Constitu­
tion. 
When he introduced what became the Bill of Rights, Madison did 
not accept the fears of the Anti-Federalists or others who asked for 
amendments. He thought a bill of rights was utterly unnecessary, 5 4  but 
Madison was willing to concede "that in a certain form and to a certain 
extent," a bill of rights "was neither improper nor altogether use­
less."5 5  While proposing amendments that were neither "improper" 
nor "useless," Madison was careful, as he noted in a private letter to 
Edmund Randolph, to make sure that " [ t )he structure & stamina of 
the Govt. are as little touched as possible. "5 6 It is this goal of Madison 
- to protect the "structure & stamina" of the new government - that 
most illuminates the meaning of the Second Amendment. Bellesiles's 
important book, however, adds significant social, economic, and mili­
tary history background to how we understand the Founding in gen­
eral, and the Second Amendment in particular. 
Madison generally saw the Bill of Rights as clarifying the meaning 
of the Constitution, not fundamentally changing it. He had no prob­
lem expressly protecting freedom of religion, for example, because he 
did not think that the purpose of the Constitution was to allow 
Congress to regulate religion, even where Congress had plenary juris­
diction. Similarly, he was willing explicitly to protect the right of a jury 
trial in federal prosecutions, since he believed the Constitution already 
protected that right. He probably had not thought much about the 
right to counsel, but he saw no impediment to protecting it. 
He was not, however, ready to undermine the "structure & stam­
ina" of the new government. Thus, he did not dismantle the provision 
allowing Congress to create an army or to regulate the state militias. 
53. Letter of Edmund Randolph, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 88 (Herbert 
Storing ed., 1981); Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 375 (Herbert 
Storing ed., 1981 ). 
54. Paul Finkelman, supra note 44, at 302-03. 
55. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 453 (1st Cong., 1st Sess.) (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 
1789). 
56. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (June 15, 1789), in 12 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 219 (Charles F. Hobson et. al. eds., 1979). 
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He certainly had no interest in protecting a personal right to own guns, 
because, as Bellesiles demonstrates, few people had guns anyway, and 
those who did included malcontents, such as the farmers who gathered 
in Shay's Rebellion. Madison probably did not believe in the myth of 
the militia, either. He knew better. But he was happy to promise that 
the new national government would not dismantle or disarm the state 
militias, as long as they remained "well regulated," which meant under 
federal supervision as Article I required. Since some people feared the 
new national government might dismantle the state militias, 57 Madison 
was willing to put a provision in the Bill of Rights explicitly stating 
that Congress would not disarm the state militias. At the same time, 
he had no interest in preventing Congress from regulating weapons in 
the places where Congress had clear legislative power.58 Madison had 
worked for a strong government - with a national army and the 
power to federalize state militias - at the Philadelphia Convention. 
He had no interest in undermining this in the Bill of Rights by prohib­
iting a standing army, removing the power of the national government 
to control the state militias, or permitting citizens to have unfettered 
access to weapons. 
Arming America gives us a context for understanding what the 
First Congress did when it wrote what became the Second Amend­
ment. Bellesiles demonstrates, over and over again, decade by decade, 
that until the Civil War era most Americans had little interest in guns 
or gun ownership. Even in the debates over the Constitution, the fears 
of the Anti-Federalists were not about losing their guns - because 
they mostly did not have any - but about creating a standing army. 
The Anti-Federalists 59 worried that the standing army would take 
over. Madison answered that the best defense against this was a well­
regulated state militia, armed by the national government. That was 
the plan set out in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The Second 
Amendment merely reaffirmed this plan, and at the same time guaran­
teed that if the national government did not arm the militias (as the 
Constitution obligated it to do), the states could do so themselves. 
Arming America is clearly controversial. Supporters of an individ­
ual rights interpretation of the Second Amendment - what some 
57. Washington was willing to do this, as was Secretary of War Henry Knox. Senator 
Rufus King of Massachusetts opposed arming the militia on the frontier, "least they should 
Use them against the United States." THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND. OTHER 
NOTES ON SENATE DEBATES 246 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988). 
58. For a greater discussion of this, see Finkelman, supra note 6. 
59. See generally Paul Finkelman, Turning Losers into Winners: What Can We Learn, If 
Anything, from the Antifederalists?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 849 (2001) (reviewing SAUL CORNELL, 
THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN 
AMERICA 1788-1828 (1999)). 
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proponents arrogantly call "the standard model" interpretation60 -
are clearly threatened by this book. If it is true that gun ownership was 
irrelevant to most Americans, then it is hard to believe they would 
have fought to amend the Constitution to protect the right to own 
something they could not own and did not want to own. And as Don 
Higginbotham, a leading military historian, has noted, "[i]n all the dis­
cussions and debates from the Revolution to the eve of the Civil War, 
there is precious little evidence that advocates of local control of the 
militia showed an equal or even secondary concern for gun ownership 
as a personal right. "61 
Some activists have taken it upon themselves to check every foot­
note and source in the book. They flood various listservs with errors 
they have found. Doubtless they will find some in a book if over 600 
pages, almost 150 of which are densely packed footnotes. Serious 
scholars have questioned some of Bellesiles's use of probate records 
and his statistical analysis of them in determining gun ownership. It is 
likely that those numbers will change as other scholars examine the 
evidence. 
On the other hand, the simple statistics on weapons production 
and importation, and the various gun censuses taken by state and fed­
eral officials, support the conclusion that gun ownership was not all 
that common in this period. Moreover, the thesis presented here 
seems overwhelmingly solid. The nonstatistical evidence from letters, 
diaries, official reports, and statutes all point in the same direction: 
from the colonial period to the Civil War guns were expensive, com­
plicated, and not widely owned, and most Americans were not par­
ticularly skilled at using them: When we fought Britain, and when we 
wrote the Constitution and the Bill of Rights � including the Second 
Amendment - we were not a gun culture. These conclusions must in­
form us today as we debate public policy and constitutional law sur­
rounding an America that is now fully armed. 
60. For a discussion of this "model," see Saul Cornell, Commonplace of Anachronism: 
The Standard Model, the Second Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary 
Constitutional Theory, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 221 (1999), and Symposium on the Second 
Amendment: Fresh Looks, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (2000). 
61. P. 215 (quoting Don Higginbotham, The Federalized Militia Debate: A Neglected 
Aspect of Second Amendment Scholarship, 55 WM. & MARY Q. (3rd ser.) 39, 40 (1998)). 
